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Abstract 
One significant reason for current pressures on the Liberal International Order (LIO) are truth-
subversion practices, which populist leaders utilize for political domination. Truth-subversion 
practices include false speak (flagrant lying to subvert the concept of facts), double speak 
(intentional internal contradictions in speech to erode reason), and flooding (the emission of 
many messages into the public domain to create confusion). Aiming to destroy liberal truth 
ideals and practices, truth-subversion weakens epistemological security, the epistemic authority 
of core institutions, and enlightenment-based norms. It privileges baseless claims over fact-based 
opinions, thus creating communities of the like-minded between which communication becomes 
impossible. Truth-subversion challenges the LIO’s three key institutions: democracy, markets, 
and multilateralism. If truth-subversion practices prevail, societal polarization, inaccurate 
information, and emotional inflaming strain democracy and human rights protections. Markets 
that depend for their functioning on accurate information can falter, and multilateralism that 
relies on communication and reasoned consensus can decay. IR scholarship has recognized 
practices of knowledge production as a key feature underlying the LIO but has not yet identified 
challenges to those practices as a threat for the LIO. We discuss what the discipline can do to 
alleviate its blind spots. 
 
Introduction 
 
Our purpose in this article is to demonstrate that a significant reason for (rather than a mere 
consequence of) the stress the Liberal International Order (LIO) faces, is a wave of “truth-
subversion” politics. Truth-subversion practices undertaken by the Trump administration and the 
Brexit campaign provided an early (if not the only) indication that this mode of politics is 
challenging the LIO. Many books and articles in the popular press have been written about what 
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is commonly referred to as post-truth.2 Our paper adds a theoretical systematization to that 
literature that explains how specific practices of knowledge production underlie international 
orders, and how challenges to those practices plunge orders into crises. This systematization 
allows scholars to move beyond the day-to-day of populist politics and Trumpism and 
understand the broader meaning and implications of truth-subversion practices in their historical 
and international context.  
Contemporary International Relations (IR) scholarship has shown limited interest in the 
epistemological foundations of social orders, and therefore fails to explain the possible 
epistemological origins of international order change. We suggest studying truth-subversion 
practices as a form of power aimed at undermining liberal norms and institutions for the sake of 
political domination. We define truth-subversion as a set of specific practices, technologies, and 
norms that illiberal leaders use to spread messages into the public domain to erode the notion of 
truth as an ideal, which formed a core foundation of the LIO. Truth-subversion practices include 
false speak (deliberate and obvious lying with the aim to subvert the concept of facts), double 
speak (intentional internal contradictions in speech eroding the notion of reason), and flooding 
(the emission of many different messages into the public domain to create confusion). These 
practices encourage people to consider their opinions as more important than facts, and help 
create communitarian identities of the like-minded. With this emotional and anti-scientific 
approach, empirical evidence will not provoke changes in perspectives and allegiances, because 
reasoned arguments across different communities become impossible.  
Rather than exploring in depth the causes that may have brought about the development of 
truth-subversion practices, we analyze the phenomenon as a distinct and irreducible challenge to 
the LIO that is anchored in broader populist practices.3 Truth-subversion is not entirely new, nor 
is it the only fundamental challenge the LIO faces. However, truth-subversion practices have 
acquired a popularity and prevalence in the contemporary era that render them a unique feature 
of the crisis disrupting the LIO. Truth-subversion destabilizes social order because it generates 
linguistic relativism, thus endangering people’s and institutions’ “epistemological security,”4 or 
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“the sense by which we get our bearings in the real world.”5 Epistemological and ontological 
security are related concepts; each one can cause the other. The concepts differ, however. While 
ontological security refers to the stability of an individual’s and a state’s identity, 
epistemological security refers to the trust in a collectively shared knowledge. 
This disruption to epistemological security poses challenges to the LIO at three different 
levels. First, the absence of a collectively-shared understanding of what is true challenges any 
form of order, because if all statements can be randomly deceptive or truthful, and if people do 
not know what is real, individuals can only base their actions on what they have directly 
experienced themselves.  
Second, truth-subversion politics can potentially threaten the Westphalian dimension of the 
international order because it makes rational communication between international political 
actors impossible. It therefore increases uncertainty, which heightens the security dilemma, and 
could in extreme circumstances lead to war.  
Third, truth-subversion politics has the most direct impact on the liberal aspects of the LIO, 
because it endangers the epistemological security on which the LIO rests. Norms of reasoned 
consensus are challenged, populations polarized, and the rational-legal authority of key 
institutions compromised. The pluralistic security community on which the LIO’s positive peace 
rests becomes impaired. If people cease sharing an epistemic understanding of what is, how can 
they know what ought to be?  
Epistemological insecurity impacts on the LIO’s three key features: political liberalism, 
economic liberalism, and liberal internationalism.6 If the public is misled and confused about 
what constitutes accurate information, fair and free elections cannot be guaranteed. Societal 
polarization and emotional arousal endanger the protection of minority rights, and therefore 
fundamental human rights. Markets depend for their functioning on accurate information. 
Multilateralism relies on coordination and cooperation, reasoned consensus, and the authority of 
international organizations.  
Many of the articles in this special issue focus on the demand side of populism, exploring why 
populations across the liberal world have become susceptible to populist and illiberal leaders. In 
contrast, this article highlights the supply side of populism. It argues that truth-subversion 
                                                
5 Arendt 2006, 257 
6 See Lake, Martin, Risse this issue	
4	
practices are a defining feature of populism in the contemporary era and that they represent a 
distinct and irreducible challenge to the LIO. Truth-subversion practitioners lie repeatedly “on 
principle, and not only with respect to particulars”7, and develop other practices to undermine the 
notions of truth, expertise, reason, and logic; relying on technologies, such as the Internet and 
social media, to extend and disseminate these practices. Proponents of the LIO, in turn, seek to 
halt truth-subversion practices by establishing standards of veracity via fact-checkers, or the 
regulation of social media sites. These ongoing struggles over factual claims, reason and logic 
are struggles over the epistemological foundations of the LIO.  
The LIO is resilient; it has the capacity to weather this storm, not least because it has been a 
comparatively prosperous and peaceful order, thanks in no small part to its reliance on science. It 
might be difficult to imitate its success in the medium and long term. Moreover, liberal 
principles are deeply engrained in liberal societies, and truth-subversion practitioners can 
dialectically generate popular pushback against their tactics. Liberal elites also might find the 
right mix of policies, regulations and technologies to restore the norms of accuracy. Ultimately 
truth-subversion practices will fade if populations cease being susceptible to them.  
The aim of this article is twofold. First, we explore truth-subversion practices as a 
fundamental challenge to the LIO; second, we set an agenda for studying international order 
change resulting from changes in practices of truth production. IR scholars should explore how 
specific practices of truth production underpin a given order, and how an unraveling of these 
practices throws international orders into crises. Numerous scholars have highlighted that 
ideational factors constitute international orders,8 because they are “what makes the world hang  
together.”9 Post-structural and critical scholars have analyzed the importance of positivist meta-
theoretical frameworks for sustaining the contemporary order.10 Our account differs from 
preceding constructivist and post-structural work, as we do not study the content of specific ideas 
or theoretical frameworks for constituting a particular order. Our focus is rather on the practical 
foundations that allow societies (rather than science or scholars) to determine what reality is. We 
therefore see our work as complementary to preceding constructivist and post-structural 
scholarship. Furthermore, while our account is ideational, it also attributes a role to practices, 
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technology, and material reality for establishing truth claims. It thus acknowledges that material 
factors play an important role, albeit not an exclusive one, in the production of truth claims. 
To set the agenda for this research program we first explore how truth practices underpin 
international orders. Second, we elaborate why and how severe challenges to established truth 
practices threaten the stability of international orders. Third, we describe the epistemic authority 
that prevails in the LIO. We then differentiate between liberal lying practices, fascist practices of 
creating totalizing truths, and truth-subversion practices, and we provide a taxonomy of truth-
subversion practices. Fifth, we elaborate on how truth-subversion practices jeopardize the 
epistemological security upon which the LIO rests, and endanger the LIO’s three key features of 
political liberalism, economic liberalism, and liberal internationalism. We conclude by arguing 
that IR scholarship has recognized practices of knowledge production as a key feature underlying 
the LIO, but has stopped short of identifying challenges to those practices and the threats they 
signify for the LIO. We discuss what the discipline can do to alleviate its blind spots. 
Epistemological Foundations of International Order 
We remain agnostic about what truth really is. We do not take a side in debates between a 
correspondence theory of truth and a theory of truth as intersubjective validity standards. Instead, 
we are interested in what people collectively think truth is and how they establish truth claims 
through shared practices. Our major theoretical claim is that all international orders, and 
particularly liberal orders, require a societally-recognized notion of truth as their basic condition 
of possibility, because such a shared notion of truth is a prerequisite for communication and 
coordination. Philosophers at least from Augustine onwards considered truth an important 
element for the functioning of societies,11 although they differed in their understandings of what 
truth entailed. If a societally-shared notion of truth unravels, societies plunge into chaos. In the 
enlightenment tradition, a notion of reasoned scientific truth and facts is important and supported 
by recognized practices of truth production, which bestow epistemic authority. This lineage has 
underpinned the LIO. Practices of truth-subversion aim at undermining any possibility of 
recognizing a shared notion of truth. 
 
Practices of Truth Production Underpin International Orders  
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Practices of truth production are important in ensuring the functionality of international orders 
for two reasons. First, they translate material reality into discourses and policy 
recommendations.12 For example, scientific discoveries related to global warming prompt 
political actors to pursue climate change mitigation policies. Second, practices of truth 
production secure the epistemological ground for societies to determine a public and 
collectively-shared sense of the world. This epistemological security helps individuals and 
communities experience orderliness, safety, and the absence of threats to their identity, 
conditions which result from justified beliefs in the knowledge on which their “common-sense 
reality” rests.13 Communication, argumentation, and cooperation all become possible as a result 
of this shared common-sense reality. In its absence, trust and confidence in fact-based opinions 
weaken, and maintaining international orders becomes difficult.  
To illustrate further, lack of trust is the primary difficulty in the security dilemma. Game 
theoretic approaches on which the security dilemma rests assume that international actors do not 
communicate with each other, or alternatively that talk is cheap, and that verbal utterances are 
unreliable.14 But international actors can – and do – communicate with each other. Experimental 
and historical research suggests, when they do, the equilibrium outcome expected from the 
prisoner’s dilemma (defection) becomes significantly less likely.15 Similarly, Fearon proposed 
that the security dilemma is notably ameliorated between democracies, because of their superior 
communication capacities.16 Democratic states face higher audience costs at home if they back 
down in a crisis, and can therefore communicate their resolve more credibly than autocracies. 
But if truth-subversion practices become flagrant, it becomes impossible to discern whether or 
not a leader escalated a crisis, whether or not he/she backed down, or who was responsible for 
starting a war. If truth-subversion practices are widespread, the result will be an absence of 
reliable communication, a heightened uncertainty about others’ intentions, and a lack of trust. 
These characteristics significantly increase the security dilemma, challenging not only the 
Westphalian features of the contemporary order, but perhaps the possibilities of order altogether.  
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Every international order can have different practices of truth production that will shape, but 
not fully determine, that order’s system of rule and authority. What counts as truth historically 
varies. But for any social order to exist, shared standards for evaluating truth claims must exist. 
Practices of truth production are socially-meaningful patterned actions that establish what 
exists in the world. They are the organized nexuses of doings and sayings that practical 
understandings link together, and the rules that people adhere to when establishing truth claims.17 
The LIO includes, for example, scientific practices of experimentation and argumentation, 
statistical data analysis, interviewing, and investigative journalism, as well as public policy 
debates, peer review processes, and institutional selection mechanisms that lead to the selective 
retention of some findings and the discarding of others. In the medieval period, in contrast, 
practices of truth production rested on interpreting religious scriptures with the help of logical 
reasoning and a focus on ideas’ essences, rather than on the observation of concrete realities or 
specific entities as they existed in the world. Logically-consistent argument and reasoning were 
preferred, but this “scholastic philosophy, as perfected by Thomas Aquinas, was not very 
favorable to the growth of natural science, because, in its emphasis on an inner reality, it drew 
attention away from the actual details and behavior of concrete things.”18 
Practices of truth production are embedded in normative understandings about the values and 
purposes of knowledge production. For example, modern scientific practices rest on 
enlightenment thought and the primacy of reason and rationality, whereas medieval practices of 
truth production had as their foundation the normative value of discovering the God-given 
natural order.19  
The production and dissemination of truth claims requires specific technologies, and truth-
production practices evolve in tandem with technologies. The technologies render specific 
practices possible, but they do not determine them. Only with the availability of dissemination 
technologies can large audiences access societal truths, allowing a shared epistemological basis 
for an international order to emerge. Because these technologies shape the communication of 
truth claims and who has access to communicate those claims, the technologies of dissemination 
also influence epistemic authority. For example, with the advent of paper, the printing press, and 
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writing in the vernacular, the dissemination of written texts dramatically increased in the early 
modern period. Books became significantly cheaper, and the Church lost its quasi-monopoly on 
knowledge production.20  
Within international orders, certain actors acquire epistemic authority; that is, the societal 
legitimacy and trust to establish truth claims.21 In the LIO, epistemic authority resides in a 
diffuse transnational community whose members span universities, research institutes, think 
tanks, international organizations, select NGOs, and some MNCs.22  
Practices of truth production, normative understandings about the values and purposes of 
knowledge production, dissemination technologies, and epistemic authority form a web of tightly 
interrelated factors. When this web unravels, international orders plunge into crises.     
International Orders’ Crises Triggered by Challenges to Established Practices of Truth 
Production 
There are two fundamental challenges to truth-production practices that can lead to major crises 
and potentially the collapse of international orders. First, the discrepancies between factual 
reality and truth-subverting claims can become so large that such discord may lead to flawed 
policy decisions and ungovernable societies.23 When truth-production practices stop serving the 
pragmatic purpose of providing a reasonable foundation for governing, reality can kick back.24 
Some political leaders had this painful realization during the Covid-19 pandemic, such as when 
Donald Trump propagated the injection of bleach to cure Covid-19, or Mexican President Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador promoted hugging. 
Second, alternative practices of truth production can challenge an order’s truth practices. If 
this challenge becomes substantive people lose the ability to evaluate truth claims, and they 
suffer from epistemological insecurity. People cease to know what is true, a condition which 
threatens the epistemological ground for determining a public and collectively-shared sense of 
the world. Different parts of society might believe in different truths, and these cleavages can 
become so massive that communication and cooperation between different communities cease to 
be possible. The public sphere disappears and a tower of Babel emerges. Societies fall out of 
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order, and in extreme cases plunge into chaos. The reformation was such a period, when the 
invention of the printing press caused the Church to lose its monopoly on the production of truth 
claims. Humanists and reformers placed each individual and their capacity for independent 
reasoning and empirical observation at the center of the universe.25 A long period of civil strife 
and general confusion came to an end, in part, through the development of a new synthesis, 
rather than via a radical break with the past. Epistemological insecurity is also a major challenge 
the LIO faces today. 
Practices of Truth-Subversion Challenge the LIO 
 
Practices of truth-subversion most directly threaten the liberal aspects of the contemporary order. 
Conforming with the introduction to this special issue, we identify the LIO as a western-led order 
that emerged after 1945, has as its core members liberal democracies, and at present does not 
fully comprise many states, including China, Russia, and some Islamic countries. The order has 
been backed up by US hegemonic power and over time adopted a neoliberal touch. Science often 
supported this neoliberal ideology. But the order is also based on the enlightenment notion of 
liberalism, whose basic principles are equality of individuals, self-determination, and the pursuit 
of individual freedom. Three distinct but interrelated components of liberalism support these 
principles: democracy and the rule of law including protection of human rights (political 
liberalism), free markets (economic liberalism), and multilateralism based on “’generalized’ 
principles of human conduct” (liberal internationalism).26  
The LIO is a comparatively peaceful and prosperous order, and its core member states 
developed a pluralistic security community in which they share “dependable expectations of 
peaceful change.”27 Important for maintaining this order is that the domestic regimes of the 
LIO’s core member states are liberal democracies, for two reasons. First, democracies are 
decentralized and transparent in their decision-making. Together with transnationalism and 
global capitalism, this creates multiple access points to decision-making and non-domestic actors 
have opportunities to find their interests represented. “The democratic industrial world exhibits 
patterns of political order that lie between traditional images of domestic and international 
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politics, thus creating an unusual and distinctive subsystem in world politics.”28 Second, the core 
democratic member states and their peoples have shared a civic identity attached to the pursuit of 
individual freedom and human rights, as well as capitalist modes of consumption. 
Communitarian and integral nationalist identities were kept at bay in favor of a measure of 
cosmopolitanism. Socialization in multilateral institutions further contributed to this shared 
identity.29 These features established trust among the order’s key participants, although not 
always beyond that core. 
 
Epistemic Authority in the LIO 
The LIO has as its condition of possibility truth-production practices that emerged from 
enlightenment thought and rest on experimental science, observation, and reason.30 In the 
nineteenth century, the professionalization of the social sciences began. New universities such as 
Sciences Po and the LSE emerged, institutions which were supposed to provide bureaucrats and 
statesmen with the qualifications needed to lead their respective countries. “The practice of 
political decision-making became ever more dependent upon basic truths spelled out by elites in 
their capacity as ‘experts’.”31 Central to these developments was a mission to promote progress 
in European societies through research. Statistical methods served that purpose; they appeared to 
provide “an exact representation of the external world.”32 These new ideas caused difficulties 
both for dynastic rule based on divine rights, and for the authority of the Catholic Church. The 
liberal order’s democratic foundations entail the understanding that political elites have been 
elected by the many to rule on their behalf in a transparent way, which permits citizens to 
evaluate governmental actions. Citizens had to be educated, such that general education went 
hand-in-hand with citizenship rights. Mass media provided the public with accurate information 
for decision-making, and the tradition of investigative journalism scrutinized elites’ public 
statements and policies. The press reserved some pages for citizens’ commentaries, and thus 
provided a public space for debate and argument. 
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 Market economies depend for their functioning on an adequate degree of information, and on 
science and research to promote economic growth.33 International organizations emerged in 
parallel with the spread of the industrial revolution,34 and the same enlightenment ideas also 
influenced their epistemic authority. Based on the normative values of rationalism, legalism, and 
a bureaucratic culture, and backed up with hegemonic power, international organizations such as 
the IMF, the WTO, or the EU are buttressed by authority. They use this authority to perform 
governmental functions in the international realm (admittedly often in line with neoliberal 
ideology), and thus direct the interactions between states and other actors.35 
In sum, the enlightenment’s focus on reason, observation, and individualism promoted the 
role of science and expertise in politics. A transnational community of actors emanating from 
specific organizations, including universities, research institutes and the mass media, possess the 
relevant epistemic authority to establish truths upon which the key institutions of the LIO 
depend, namely democracies, markets, and international organizations. 
 The epistemic authority in the LIO and the LIO itself have recently come under strain. Many 
authors in this special issue highlight demand factors in the population that made citizens 
susceptible to populist messages. These factors include regional economic inequalities,36 extreme 
economic inequalities between the 1% and the rest,37 the economic effects of immigration,38 
institutional inefficiencies in shielding the workforce from globalization’s effects,39 the demand 
for recognition on the part of the left-behinds;40 the quest for localized and spatially-constrained 
identities,41 and the role of racism and white nationalism.42 Many of these features emerged from 
specific aspects of the LIO’s design.  
 In contrast to these accompanying articles in this special issue, our argument focuses on the 
supply side of populism. Truth-subversion practices can spread in a media environment lacking 
checks on the accuracy of disseminated messages, and when the population is susceptible to 
these messages. In recent years, populist politicians and their promoters—who hitherto almost 
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exclusively existed at the margins of liberal democracies—entered the mainstream in many 
western liberal societies. They deliberately developed and refined a set of truth-subversion 
practices — including but not limited to purposeful and flagrantly visible lying – to create 
epistemological insecurity, thereby undermining the domestic and international liberal order. 
These politicians found inspiration, and sometimes outright support, from populist leaders in 
illiberal democracies and authoritarian regimes such as those in Russia or Venezuela.43 The 
widespread use of social media was central in changing the opportunity structures for the 
dissemination of truth claims.44 Compared with traditional broadcasting, social media 
dramatically reduced the entry costs for disseminating messages and provided the means to avoid 
the mediation via mainstream media.45 This diminished the role of gatekeepers who were 
responsible for detecting misinformation,46 and therefore undermined the epistemic authority of 
mainstream media in the LIO. In turn, political entrepreneurs (mainly but not exclusively from 
the ultra-right) used this new opportunity structure to develop highly effective truth-subversion 
practices and spread their statements widely. Their success is due to a certain susceptibility to 
these messages in the population originating from the demand factors of populism highlighted 
above. 
Truth-subversion practitioners are challenging the LIO primarily through the operation of 
domestic politics. Specific emerging features in the international structure, such as social media, 
and populist allies in other democracies, hybrid regimes, and autocracies, support truth-
subversion practitioners in their domestic battles. 
 
Differentiating between lying to deceive, creating a totalizing truth, and truth-subversion 
practices 
We can differentiate between three sets of communication practices: 1) lying to deceive, 2) truth-
subversion practices, and 3) creating a totalizing truth to prohibit dissent. First, the truth-
subversion practices adopted by illiberal leaders differ substantially from the practices of lying 
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that political leaders in liberal democracies typically engage in. Liberal democratic leaders may 
lie to deceive the public or the international community for personal gain, to pursue specific 
policies they think are important but are likely to be unpopular, or for national security reasons.47 
They take great care when crafting their lies.48 They take a notion of truth as granted, rely on its 
existence, and by doing so acquire power in the act of lying. If their dishonesty is uncovered, the 
population experiences a moment of epistemological insecurity, but this epistemological 
insecurity can recover reasonably well if a collectively-shared parameter of truth exists in the 
relevant society. In such cases, the exposed delinquent experiences a loss of power.  
In perhaps the most prominent post-war example of lying in a liberal democracy, Richard 
Nixon lied to cover up his own involvement in the Watergate affair. In this act of lying, he did 
not discursively challenge the notion of truth, but rather relied on it, and used it to deceive. For 
instance, in his first Watergate speech Nixon declared that “members of the White House staff 
should appear and testify voluntarily under oath before the Senate committee which investigates 
Watergate,” and that “the truth should be fully brought out, no matter who was involved.” In 
announcing the resignation of key staff members in 1973, Nixon argued that “Watergate 
represented a series of illegal acts and bad judgements by a number of individuals. It was the 
system that has brought the facts to light.”49 Eventually Nixon had to resign when his lies were 
uncovered, an event recalled as one of the starkest instances of a loss of power following the 
discovery of dishonesty. Two decades later, after being exposed for having lied under oath about 
his affair with Monica Lewinsky, Bill Clinton apologized for having “misled” the public, thus 
acknowledging the normative value of the notion of truth.50 Perhaps because of the stark 
consequences that can result from the detection of lies, and contrary to popular belief, liberal 
democratic leaders lie with great care and do not get caught very frequently in the act of lying.51  
In contrast, truth-subversion practitioners seek to dismantle the very notion of truth for the 
sake of power and domination. They do not care whether they get caught lying; their power 
increases the more attention they garner and the more they manage to shape people’s emotions. 
In such a process, not every statement they utter needs to be a lie; the statements rather have the 
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features of bullshit. While bullshit “is produced without concern for the truth, it need not be 
false… The essence of bullshit is [therefore] not that it is false but that it is phony.” 52 
Truth-subversion practices share similarities with autocratic, even fascist communication 
practices, and most prominent among these connections is the reliance on emotions rather than 
reason. As Timothy Snyder wrote, “in fascism feeling is first. Fascists of the 1920s and 1930s 
wanted to undo the enlightenment and appeal to people as members of a tribe, race, or species. 
What mattered was a story of us and them.”53 It is the political movements and news outlets of 
the far right that most consistently—though by no means exclusively—use truth-subversion 
practices. The messages they disseminate often contain racist and nationalist overtones, harbor a 
distrust for traditional elites, and seek to speak directly to the people, to whom they promise a 
return to an idealized past. There are important similarities between the contemporary era and the 
1930s, and George Orwell’s term “double think” neatly describes the epistemological insecurity 
that can result from autocratic communication practices as well as truth-subversion practices:  
To know and not to know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully 
constructed lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which canceled out, knowing them to 
be contradictory and believing in both of them, to use logic against logic, to repudiate 
morality while laying claim to it ... 54 
 
While communist and fascist forces might have deployed truth-subversion practices prior to their 
consolidation of power, truth-subversion practices of today differ from the propaganda output of 
totalitarian regimes. Perhaps the most striking difference is that the propaganda machinery of 
totalitarian regimes was extraordinarily consistent and did not allow for contradictions or 
dissent.55 This is also to some extent true for many authoritarian regimes today. The aim is to 
fully control public opinion by censoring any possible dissent and creating a rigid and internally-
coherent worldview. While this might be truth-subversion practitioners’ goal, this goal is 
currently unobtainable. Not only are many such practitioners operating in democracies in which 
they do not have the power to curtail free speech (or at least in hybrid regimes, in which it is not 
fully possible to shut out dissent), but the internet and social media platforms render speech 
difficult to monopolize. Instead, truth-subversion practitioners aim to create confusion.  
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A Taxonomy of Truth-subversion practices 
 Truth-subversion practices are such practices that seek to undermine the epistemological 
foundations of an order. Our empirical focus is the post-2016 period, and the challenges truth-
subversion practices have posed to the LIO during this period. We leave it to others to evaluate 
whether our analytical framework can be applicable to other time periods and geographical 
settings. Similar practices of purposefully promoting epistemological insecurity might, for 
example, have been brought into play in the nascent American Republic, in 19th century 
European parliamentary politics, in twentieth century Latin America, or in the contentious 
politics of inter-war Europe. 
  The most obvious practice of truth-subversion is false speak, which is outright purposeful 
lying in an easily verifiable way. A prominent example is the claim by the Vote Leave campaign 
in the UK’s referendum on EU membership that Turkey would soon become a member state.  
A second truth-subversion practice is double speak, which relates to the development of 
internal contradictions in one’s own speech. Such blatant internal contradictions challenge 
reasoned speech on which enlightenment ideals of truth depend. For example, during a news 
briefing Donald Trump asserted, “We’re going to put a hold on money spent to the WHO.” 
Shortly thereafter, when a reporter asked him whether he was going to withhold money from the 
WHO during a pandemic, he responded: “I’m not saying I’m going to do it.” “But we are going 
to look at it.”56 
 A third truth-subversion practice is inflammatory speak, which seeks to enrage the population. 
It involves attacks against opponents with a vocabulary that has hitherto been deemed 
inappropriate for mainstream political exchanges. A prominent example of this are Trump’s 
attacks on the media as “the enemy of the people.” Andreas Kalbitz, one of the leading 
politicians of Germany’s far-right AfD party, called a climate activist in a regional election 
debate a “pigtail-faced moon-face girl.”57  
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A fourth form of truth-subversion is promoting alternative facts. This practice entails direct 
verbal attacks against the enlightenment notion of truth and the epistemic authority of key 
institutions based on that notion. A prominent example is the reference by Kellyanne Conway, 
Counselor to the US President, to “alternative facts” in a TV interview. “Alternative facts” 
transform opinion into facts. Another example is the derision of expertise, as when Michael 
Gove, the UK’s justice secretary, claimed that “people in this country have had enough of 
experts.”58  
A fifth practice routinely used by illiberal regimes in the internet age is that of flooding. These 
regimes disseminate many kinds of messages across the web, such that truth becomes 
undiscernible for the general populace.59 Trump appears to imitate that practice: he has issued an 
average of 7.5 false statements per day since he came into office, a daily average peaking at 16 in 
June and July 2018.60 In Brazil, 90% of respondents have been exposed to fake news about the 
pandemic on WhatsApp, and 70% of respondents trusted the information.61  
Sixth is misplaced faith.62 This notion refers to statements about a future success voiced with 
high conviction, ignoring the complexity of challenges that lie ahead. For example, in the early 
days of the Covid-19 pandemic Jair Bolsonaro claimed that Brazil would not be severely 
affected, because Brazilians “never catch anything. You see some bloke jumping into the 
sewage, he gets out, has a dive, right? And nothing happens to him.”63 
Seventh, in seeking to sow discord, social polarization and disdain for truth, illiberal leaders 
disseminate conspiracy theories. For example, Victor Orban claimed that George Soros wanted 
to take over Hungary. 
These truth-subversion practices are not mutually exclusive, and neither this topography nor 
the practices used by truth-subverters are preserved in aspic. Furthermore, while some of these 
discursive strategies were used historically in the LIO in isolation to obtain specific objectives, 
they were not used in combination with this degree of concentration with the express objective to 
undermine the LIO’s truth architecture, other than at the margins. 
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The Spread of Truth-subversion Practices 
The nature of the internet means that it is difficult to establish absolute control over the 
dissemination of messages in either liberal or authoritarian regimes.64 As a result, it is harder for 
authoritarian and hybrid regimes to fully control speech on their own territories as they may once 
have done. Indeed, such regimes might also have identified advantages in controlling social 
media and speech less rigorously, such as early warnings of people’s dissatisfaction with specific 
policies.65 Because of the difficulties inherent in completely controlling speech, these regimes 
instead increasingly resorted to truth-subversion practices (notably flooding) to sow confusion, 
several years before these practices became a serious concern in established democracies. 
Although scholars during this period noticed that truth-subversion practices could negatively 
influence prospects for emerging democracies,66 before Trump’s election and the Brexit 
referendum it was less clear whether such practices would have a similar impact in established 
liberal democracies. It first appeared that such democracies might have sufficiently strong civil 
societies to withstand the challenge from these tactics.67 Equally, Russia’s international 
communication strategy appeared curiously out of touch, unfocused, and eccentric. The danger 
truth-subversion practices pose has only become fully apparent since their unexpected success in 
established democracies.  
Democracies can nowadays weaken following democratic elections in which truth-subversion 
practices play a major role. The 2016 US presidential election firmly placed this phenomenon on 
the world stage. 68 Popular engagement with fake news stories increased dramatically in the run 
up to the election, while engagement with true news stories decreased as the election date moved 
closer.69 Not only did the Trump campaign make truth-subversion practices highly visible and 
demonstrated their success, but it also provided legitimacy to practices that liberal democracies 
had hitherto shunned and admonished when used by countries in the global south. The newfound 
legitimacy of these practices makes their spread more likely. Particularly since the 2016 US 
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election, a rising number of political entrepreneurs and their consultants have imitated similar 
practices. In 30 of the 65 countries surveyed in 2017 by Freedom House, paid government 
commentators organized online disinformation campaigns.70 Since 2013, there has been a steady 
rise in the number of governments involved in disinformation efforts. 
  Extreme right parties like France’s Front National and Germany’s AfD use the internet and 
social media to deploy truth-subversion practices. The AfD, for example, has become more 
advanced in using social media than mainstream German parties.71 In Brazil, social media and 
fake news contributed to the success of the far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro in winning the 
2018 presidential elections.  
Although public rallies offer a useful secondary means, social media remains the ideal vehicle 
for populists to practice truth-subversion. Social media sites are the primary entry point from 
which people acquire fake news stories,72 and on those sites, fake news stories outperform 
accurate news stories in user engagement. A 2018 study, analyzing all verified news stories 
posted worldwide on Twitter since its launch in 2006, found that false news stories spread faster 
and more widely than true news stories by a wide margin, and that such false news stories 
generated emotional reactions of “fear disgust and surprise.”73 Fake news stories can be more 
sensationalist than factual news stories, and can be easier to digest than more nuanced news 
stories, which instead aim at accuracy. Fake news thus has a higher likelihood of provoking a 
reaction. "Liking" and sharing on Twitter and Facebook give people recognition for what they 
share and like, a process which positively reinforces their views, and creates group cohesion. 
Through these means truth-subversion practitioners have reached large portions of the 
population. According to Facebook figures, Russian disinformation alone on that platform likely 
reached 126 million users in the months preceding the 2016 US election.74 A 2016 opinion poll 
reported that 32% of respondents said they often see fake news online, and that 39% see it 
sometimes.75 This data suggests that truth-subversion is a widespread phenomenon. 
 
Truth-subversion Practices Create Epistemological Insecurity 
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Truth-subversion practices create epistemological insecurity, both at the individual level and 
at the level of social orders. The concept of epistemological security is associated with the more 
familiar concept of “ontological security”— or “a sense of confidence of one’s identity rooted in 
habits and routines”76—if only because, as with the broader concepts of epistemology and 
ontology, they are co-dependent. The concepts differ, however, because while ontological 
security refers to the stability of the individual and corporate (state) self, epistemological security 
refers to trust in the common-sense knowledge needed to know oneself.  
For the individual, epistemological insecurity is a state of disorientation about what is true and 
real. It emerges from information inconsistencies and ambiguities, and generates uncertainty.77 
Widespread truth-subversion practices sow “seeds of doubt and confusion among subjects.”78 
For example, in a 2016 opinion poll, 64% of respondents thought that “fabricated news stories 
cause a great deal of confusion about the basic facts of current issues and events,” and a further 
23% thought that such stories cause at least some confusion.79 This epistemological insecurity 
leads to a lack of trust, and the resulting disorientation can result in ontological insecurity – a 
perceived threat to one’s identity. The confusion simultaneously generates a desire for sense-
making.80 As the epistemic authority of leading institutions weakens, the fallback becomes a 
reliance on one’s individual opinions and beliefs. Actors actively search for a coherent 
worldview to rid themselves of discomforting feelings of ambiguity and internal contradictions.81 
If this reliance on personal opinions and beliefs becomes very strong, it can restore ontological 
security and lead to an overly zealous sense of the self. 
As a feature of social order, epistemological insecurity means that there is no single socially-
agreed-upon metric for establishing what is true. Disagreements about what counts as knowledge 
and truth occur, creating multiple incompatible versions of truth-making and truth-production, 
and challenging the epistemic authority of key institutions. The platform for a unifying public 
sphere in which open debate is possible crumbles, and the role of arbiters in evaluating and 
judging truth claims evaporates.  
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Epistemological insecurity manifests itself in four ways on the LIO. First, such insecurities 
make effective government extremely challenging. The alignment of expectations around facts, 
events, norms, and principles is paramount.82 Governments and policymakers have to coordinate 
interests and intentions, and require stable expectations to be able to do so. The same uncertainty 
makes it difficult to coordinate international activities and can generate suspicion among 
established partners, thus challenging the effective operation of multilateralism.  
Second, epistemological insecurity threatens enlightenment norms and principles, including 
reason and rationality, science and expertise, and the ideology of liberal internationalism, which 
are the foundations for peaceful cooperation in the LIO. These liberal principles are instead 
replaced by intensified inciting of emotions.   
Third epistemological insecurity challenges the truth claims of key institutions and can erode 
their authority. For example, the Democracy Project found that 68% of respondents believed 
media accuracy to be getting worse.83 The same distrust of expertise undermines the foundations 
on which IO’s authority rests.  
Fourth, truth-subversion practices polarize domestic and international societies. Populations 
no longer have a shared basis on which to evaluate truth claims, so reasoned discussions across 
camps become impossible.84 Research indicates that partisan divides in the US are entrenched as 
never before.85 These divides mitigate against social and political consensus about functions, 
statuses, and constitutive normative rules. These same cleavages also hinder global 
interconnectedness, thus promoting disassociation and undermining liberal internationalism. 
How else would people stay “connected” without a common epistemic background? 
 
Truth-subversion’s Challenges to Political Liberalism, Economic Liberalism, and Liberal 
Internationalism 
 
Epistemological insecurity and its effects test the LIO’s three fundamental features: political 
liberalism, economic liberalism, and liberal internationalism. We discuss each of these 
dimensions in turn. 
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(1) Since the Enlightenment, two conceptions have competed to determine democracy’s 
epistemic authority; one that enshrines rule in expertise as held by enlightened elites, and another 
that enshrines rule in the collective wisdom of “the people.”86 John Dewey and Hannah Arendt 
persuasively argued for a compromise position through which publics should inform political 
judgments, but where such judgements should be based on facts—and when possible—on 
science.87 A shared understanding of what is real and true is a prerequisite for people to assess 
their government’s performance.88 In the absence of such a shared understanding, government 
becomes resistant to domestic and international scrutiny. 
 Populists, however, are not moved by a concern for popular democracy, let alone by finding a 
balance between republicanism and popular democracy. Rather, moved by the goal of political 
domination, they pretend to be democrats, calling attention to people’s judgement and common 
sense. But by using truth-subversion practices they prevent the public from undertaking 
politically-informed judgments. The rise of populism in the West was not the reason for the 
consolidation of truth-subversion, but there is rather an elective affinity between both: “the 
upsurge of populist politics is symptomatic of the consolidation of post-truth communication as a 
distinctive feature of contemporary politics.”89 As Waisboard explains:  
The root of populism’s opposition to truth is its binary vision of politics. For populism ‘the 
people’ and ‘the elites’ hold their own version of truth. All truths are necessarily partial 
and anchored social interests…. A common truth is impossible given the essential nature of 
antagonistic, conflict-centered politics.90 
 
 One of the ways through which political leaders practice populism into existence is by 
exposing the supposed conspiracy of political, economic, intellectual, and media elites that 
amass their own power and epistemic authority to the detriment of popular opinion and popular 
“common sense.”91 Having already confused the public, populist leaders create a democratic 
fiction.92 They make a double move of simultaneously consolidating their own epistemic 
authority while destroying elites’ established authority. Having entirely relativized all possible 
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approaches to facts, they encourage people to trust their own personal opinions, which they 
reinforce with emotionally inflaming and conspiratorial thought.93 A tightly-knit community of 
the like-minded based on nativist tribal identities can emerge, where reasoned argument is 
impossible.94 This community forms the home base, without which populist rule cannot stand. 
Truth-subversion practices have thus contributed to the rise of new domestic actors, like right-
wing nationalist parties, that challenge the foundations of democracy. 
 We do not make any predictions about whether truth-subversion practices will become more 
dominant or whether they will recede, as we consider it an open battle. Instead, we highlight 
some mechanisms and indicators through which truth-subversion practices will further challenge 
the LIO if they continue to gain dominance.  
Illiberal leaders’ verbal attacks on the press are leading to declining trust in media. In some 
cases, populists are actively preventing the press from providing checks on governments. 
Consequently, if truth-subversion practices become more dominant, we expect indicators of 
press freedom to decline. Furthermore, if concerted disinformation campaigns (potentially with 
the intervention of foreign powers) become the norm in election periods, it is no longer possible 
to speak of the conduct of “free and fair” elections. Rising partisan divisions, increasing 
emotional inflaming, an absence of accurate information, and the disappearance of a public 
sphere can also erode protections of minority rights and human rights, which can potentially 
result in violence, as in the US in the wake of George Floyd’s death. When inaccurate and 
emotionally inflammatory information engulfs the majority, paying attention to minorities 
becomes difficult, pluralism is strained, and the rule of law gets tested. 
 In sum, if truth-subversion practices become predominant, we predict a rise in populist parties 
as represented in election results and opinion polls, and deterioration both in overall indicators of 
democracy and in individual metrics linked to minority rights, the rule of law, press freedom, and 
free and fair elections. 
 Such developments would strain the community of values upon which the LIO rests. The 
challenge to the LIO’s legitimacy would test its cooperative nature and could make the order 
more antagonistic and conflictual. An emerging lack of transparency and the closing off of 
multiple access points to decision-making for international actors would strain important 
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transnational features, while new covert forms of transnational collaboration emerge between 
authoritarian regimes and illiberal western leaders. Lastly, new populist regimes—particularly if 
they sustain themselves in major western countries—can become in people’s minds the model 
for governing to be pursued elsewhere by imitation. 
 (2) Epistemological insecurity undermines open markets through two major means. First, 
truth-subversion practices generate insecurity within financial, commercial, and other markets, 
because markets depend on reliable information to operate effectively. If market actors do not 
trust the information they receive, market mechanisms run amok. Certain algorithms used on 
financial markets depend on news feeds and what is trending on social media sites.95 In one 
occasion in 2013, the Dow Jones lost 143 points in the few minutes following the tweet of a fake 
news item.96 In another instance, the spread of a fake news item resulted in 130 billion-dollar 
losses on the stock market.97  
Second, because of its implications for polarization, epistemological insecurity strains 
consensual domestic social purposes’ adoption and sustenance. Epistemological insecurity 
challenges the reconstruction of “embedded liberalism’s” principles, upon which the postwar 
international economic order has rested.98 Difficulties in achieving compromises at the domestic 
level reinforce the adverse effects of truth-subversion on international actors’ stable expectations 
that are grounded on previously agreed norms, rules, and principles. The resulting strains in 
international cooperation can weaken the LIO’s international economic institutions and regimes, 
and may end-up destroying their social legitimacy. The consequence can be economically 
suboptimal policies. For example, trade wars—such as the one that rages between the US and 
China—can trigger economic recessions, and even plunge the world into a global depression. 
(3) Epistemological insecurity tests multilateralism on several fronts. First, targeted 
misinformation campaigns can deceive citizens on the advantages and disadvantages of 
international cooperation. The primary case in point is the UK’s vote to exit the European Union, 
which occurred in part due to an extraordinarily successful misinformation campaign. Data from 
168 opinion polls conducted in the UK between September 2015 and June 2016 demonstrate that 
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until March 2016, a majority of the population was in favor of remaining in the EU. Once the 
campaign progressed, voters became more inclined to vote “Leave.”99 The Leave campaign spent 
almost all its funding on social media, and the three key messages British voters remembered 
from the referendum campaign were all inaccurate Vote Leave messages.100 At the time of 
writing, the same truth-subversion practices continue to make it difficult to negotiate a regulated 
exit from the EU.  
 Second, epistemological insecurity entails a lack of predictability, which makes it hard for 
other leaders in the international arena to collaborate and threatens the trust between core 
member states. If some states still openly expose liberal values, while others do not, the shared 
identity of core member states that formed the foundation for the pluralistic security community 
will disappear. If there is a widespread lack of trust in expertise, the authority of international 
organizations will weaken. If truth-subversion practices gain dominance, we expect decreasing 
international collaboration in the form of signed treaties and membership of international 
organizations. Perhaps less noticeably, international organizations may become empty vessels. 
While they may continue to exist formally, epistemological insecurity can lead to their paralysis.  
 
An IR Research Agenda for Addressing the Epistemological Challenges to the 
International Order  
Constructivist scholars, and particularly those inspired by Habermas’s communicative action 
theory, have referred to the importance of deliberative discourse, truth seeking, and 
argumentation in the LIO. They highlight that reasoning and argumentation are central in 
achieving mutual understanding, solving collective problems, and reaching an agreement over 
shared norms.101 Constructivists also assumed that the public sphere would scrutinize actors’ 
statements thanks to a shared (and presumably liberal) normative framework.102 Even if actors 
are not interested in reaching a reasoned consensus, some scholars have argued that such actors 
can be rhetorically entrapped and coerced into agreeing policies that are not in their interest and 
that they were not convinced of.103 This rhetorical entrapment can contribute to order 
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maintenance.104 But this scholarship has generally not considered how discursive practices aimed 
at subverting the very notion of truth destroy the baseline from which reasoned consensus or 
rhetorical entrapment operate. Although Constructivists have highlighted the foundations that 
practices of knowledge production provide for the maintenance of order, they have not to the 
same extent considered the possibility of order change based on changes in these practices.  
Foucauldian and Postmodern scholars have directed attention to historically-constituted 
power/knowledge networks that operate through discourses and create a reality that makes some 
policies seem natural. They focused on the connection between interests and knowledge, and the 
importance of knowledge for establishing control and maintaining communication.105 They 
correctly suggested that although modern forms of reason-based knowledge production appear 
transcendent, they emerged via historical processes and are thus subject to change. Moreover, 
they argued that modern knowledge and theory serve established elites—even as these 
knowledge architectures portray themselves to be neutral—and thus help to maintain existing 
power relations in support of the LIO.106 These critical scholars focused on demonstrating how 
liberal knowledge practices marginalized alternative voices.107 They were presciently concerned 
about equating science with an elitist project. Today, however, illiberal leaders are challenging 
the liberal knowledge structure not with the aim of emancipation, but rather with the goal of 
domination. Directing their attention to the repressiveness of the liberal order, critical scholars 
(although focused on change of knowledge practices) did not foresee the possible digression 
towards a more repressive world. They therefore did not develop the theoretical vocabulary to 
understand such challenges. This has been the focus of the present article. 
The epistemological challenge truth-subversion practices pose for the LIO took IR scholars by 
surprise.108 IR scholarship should undertake several steps to address its blind spots. First, being 
able to discern the challenges truth-subversion practices pose requires theorizing long-term 
historical changes that occurred over decades, perhaps centuries. While longue-durée historical 
scholarship has increased,109 major political upheavals, such as the contemporary one, suggest 
the need for more work along these lines. In this regard, it is essential to stress that truth-
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subversion practices are a form of politics with historical antecedents.110 This means that IR 
scholars need to conduct historical macro-comparative research, including for example in the 
Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the twentieth century, and our own times, and pay special 
attention to practices of truth generation and their effect on the stability and change of social 
orders. One avenue of research could consider how specific technologies—such as the printing 
press, radio, television, the internet, and social media—create opportunity structures for specific 
forms of truth generation. Comparative analyses of practices of truth generation across different 
international orders during the same period can provide further insights. Scholars could, for 
example, compare the liberal West with the Chinese zone of influence and the Islamic world. 
Second,111 IR scholarship could pay more attention to the interconnected nature of 
international, domestic, and local politics. Each tier is mutually embedded, and truth-subversion 
practices are channeled through the networks and communication arteries of these co-evolving 
social orders. But are certain core elements of the LIO (democracy, markets, and multilateralism) 
more immune to truth-subversion practices? Trump’s truth-subversion practices appear to have 
had similar effects on all LIO elements, exemplifying their interconnected nature. More 
empirical research is needed in this area.  
Third, and relatedly, studying the recent disruptions to the LIO requires paying attention to 
the transnational practices and discourses that undermine democracies, and how these may in 
turn influence the international order. In this regard, IR scholarship should consider more closely 
comparative politics research on the reasons for democratic failure and the renaissance of 
populist authoritarianism. For example, under which conditions are truth-subversion practices 
more effective? In which types of political regimes do truth-subversion practices flourish? Do 
electoral systems make a difference? What role does personality in authoritarian leadership play? 
Upon which institutional structures do truth-subversion practitioners most rely? And what kind 
of nationalism promotes truth-subversion? Lake, Martin and Risse112 rightly argue that 
nationalism has been important in promoting populism, but not all nationalisms are the same.  
Fourth, IR scholarship needs to pay more attention to political communication and media 
studies. Scholars should consider how recent sweeping technological developments have created 
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opportunities for change in everyday societal and elite practices of interaction and knowledge 
formation, and how these changed practices have influenced international order. IR scholars 
should theorize the impact of technology on ordinary citizens’ everyday practices: as a 
discipline, IR has paid scant attention to what ordinary people do. There is a need to connect 
seemingly mundane micro-developments at the national and sub-national level (such as ‘liking’ 
Facebook posts) to broad macro-level international order changes. New technologies that are 
emerging on the horizon—such as The Internet of Things, Artificial Intelligence, and big data 
analysis—have the potential to affect international order, for better or worse. Depending on how 
these technologies are used—and how they might contribute to new practices of knowledge 
formation—they could lead to digital authoritarianism, the dislocation of economies, and the 
conditioning of human behavior; all of which could mean the ‘kiss of death’ for international 
liberal practices.   
Finally, there may be some political, economic, social, educational, and communication 
practices that are more effective than others in challenging and perhaps eradicating truth-
subversion practices. Might science, for example, which has become the target of truth-
subversion practitioners, hold the key in countering their influence? Can the Covid-19 pandemic 
empower science in the long run? And if so, might this have positive effects on science’s 
epistemic authority to confront truth-subversion practices regarding other global threats, such as 
climate change?  
Conclusion 
The LIO is currently betwixt and between as an international order: the past is not gone, but the 
future has not yet arrived. There are ongoing struggles over truth claims and practices of truth 
production between proponents of the liberal order and truth-subversion practitioners. In the 
current era, liberal forces are still dominant in many democracies and can form powerful 
coalitions against illiberal leaders. Defenders of the liberal order can challenge truth-subversion 
practices through fact-checkers, stringent regulations, controls on social media posts, promotion 
of media literacy, and discursive challenges to the practices of truth-subversion. Wherever 
possible, attempts could be made to reform the LIO to eradicate some of the demand factors that 
attracted populations to truth-subversion practices in the first place. 
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Whether truth-subversion practices will flourish or fade depends in the first instance on 
populations’ susceptibility to them. A primary marker of that susceptibility are election results. 
The LIO has been a comparatively peaceful and efficient order that has allowed for 
unprecedented prosperity, in no small part due to its reliance on science in decision-making. At 
some point, a confrontation with reality—and the need to rely on science to solve conundrums 
such as the Covid-19 pandemic—can ultimately debunk ineffective truth-subversion practices 
that threaten populations’ well-being. Populations also might become weary of truth-subversion 
practices once taken-for-granted features of the liberal order (such as the rule of law, or freedom 
of expression) are visibly challenged. Liberal democracy, free trade, and multilateral institutions 
rest on principles, which, while often violated by self-identified liberal states, are nevertheless 
deeply rooted in culture and have survived previous crises.113 In some countries, where populist 
leaders and practices have become entrenched, illiberal populism has dialectically fomented a 
pushback. If the electorate fears that properties of the LIO that it takes for granted are at risk, it 
might turn its back on truth-subversion practitioners. In the meantime, we can hope that the 
LIO’s institutions are sufficiently ‘sticky’ to weather the storm. We are cautiously optimistic that 
the LIO has the necessary resilience to overcome truth-subversion practices and other threats that 
jeopardize its durability.  
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